

SOCIOLOGY

THE HUMAN SCIENCE

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In the spring of 1975, the Republic of South Vietnam collapsed. With the defeat, panic spread—a panic made worse by rumors of a bloodbath to come. In the capital, Saigon, people demonstrated against the corrupt and dying regime of President Thieu. In other parts of the country, soldiers fought with civilians for places on rescue ships. In the cities, looters grabbed what money and supplies they could as insurance for the days ahead. Parents and their children fled to the countryside. Except for family protection and the efforts of a few rescue workers, it seemed that all discipline and order had collapsed.

For the North Vietnamese, this was the moment of triumph. Propaganda was spread among the South Vietnamese. Banners, slogans, parades, and public broadcasts hailed a new era. Those who had been outlaws under the Thieu regime would be the leaders of the new order. New institutions and norms would be symbolized by new uniforms, flags, and songs. The revolution was complete.

The events of this changeover in government show nearly all the traits of collective behavior: mass demonstrations, riots, rumors, looting, propaganda, the breakdown of discipline—all motivated by discontent with the old regime.

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR: MEANING AND SOCIAL ORIGINS

Much of what we have studied so far concerns actions of groups of people, be it the group interaction discussed in Chapter 5, or

socialization, or even deviant behavior. In sociology, however, the term *collective behavior* means something different from most of these other types of group behavior, especially from formal organizational behavior.

Collective Behavior Defined

Collective behavior can be defined as relatively spontaneous actions of groups of people to relieve feelings of dissatisfaction and anxiety. Turner and Killian define *collective behavior* simply as “the actions of groups that operate without clear-cut direction from their cultures” (1972, p. 10). The most common forms of collective behavior are mass hysteria, social movements, mobs, riots, and demonstrations. Other forms of collective behavior include fads, the spreading of rumors, reactions to disaster, and the outbursts of emotional religious groups or audiences at rock concerts. All these behaviors are less disciplined and less predictable than ordinary social behavior. In collective behavior, people are strongly influenced by the actions and emotions of others.

Sociologists often ask why collective behavior arises in certain situations rather than in others. The answer seems to be that certain features of society foster particular types of collective behavior. Neil J. Smelser calls this phenomenon *structural conduciveness* (1962); we will describe it below.

Societal Origins of Collective Behavior

Collective behavior occurs most often in modern societies which are not tightly structured

The exorcists

The voice on the tapes was that of a woman, but it was unnaturally deep and the words were incoherent screams mixed with furious profanities. The tapes recorded the dying days of a timid, 23-year-old epileptic named Anneliese Michel, and they were part of the evidence in a manslaughter case West German authorities were preparing last week against the Bishop of Würzburg, Joseph Stangl, and two priests he appointed to exorcise the Devil from the young woman. When Michel died last month of malnutrition and dehydration, she weighed only 70 pounds. One of the priests, Father Arnold Renz, maintained that six devils—including Nero, Judas, Hitler, and Lucifer himself—possessed Michel and made her refuse to eat. Her parents accepted that analysis, but more liberal German Catholics challenged it. "Possession is a question of belief, not empirical fact," said theologian Ernst Veth, Michel's tutor at the University of Würzburg. "They should have called a doctor."

Newsweek, Aug. 23, 1976, p. 57. Copyright. © 1976 by Newsweek, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.

and in which information spreads rapidly. By a tightly structured society we mean one in which (1) most people agree on values and norms, (2) traditions are strong, and (3) there is little conflict over laws or such institutions as religion, government, family, and the economic system. Peasant societies and societies with a strong central government, such as the Soviet Union, are tightly structured. The United States is a loosely structured society, with wide differences of opinion on norms and freedom of expression. Collective behavior also arises when people are massed together in large cities, especially people of many different racial and ethnic backgrounds. As Smelser notes, a simple, homogeneous, agricultural society would not have had the Wall Street panic of 1929, the urban riots of the 1960s, or the women's movement.

However, some types of collective behavior can occur in any society with tensions and anxieties. The Salem witchcraft trials of the 1690s took place in a tightly structured community. Here, anxiety over the devil created distorted views, false accusations, and hostile outbursts against the accused. This type of

behavior is called *mass hysteria*, the most elemental and diffuse form of collective behavior.

FORMS OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Mass Hysteria

Smelser defines *mass hysteria* as a "belief empowering an ambiguous element in the environment with the generalized power to threaten or destroy" (1962, p. 84). Mass hysteria is often a reaction to events that seem supernatural—even in the twentieth century. After the release of the movie *The Exorcist*, for example, newspapers reported many stories about people who thought they were gripped by evil spirits. For a tragic example of this kind of thinking, see the insert "The Exorcists."

Mass hysteria and the Black Death In the Middle Ages, mass hysteria was common in times of trouble. Hysteria swept Europe dur-

ing the bubonic plague of 1348, which killed about one-third of all Europeans. Because people had no medical or scientific explanations, they turned to other beliefs. Some scholars believed that the plague was caused by bad air created by the movements of Saturn and Mars (Campbell, 1931, pp. 34–37). Many people blamed the Jews, who, according to rumor, were poisoning the wells of Christians. Then as now, outsiders made good *scapegoats*—people to blame for the trouble of society. Others accused doctors of spreading the plague rather than checking it. Doctors were stoned by crowds in France (Langer, 1964).

During the plague years, ordinary customs and mores broke down. Many of the clergy died; others gave up their duties and even their parishes. Many people became pious in hopes of escaping the plague. Others, Boccaccio tells us, were sure that “there was no other physicke more certaine, for a disease so desparate, than to drink hard, be merry, . . . singing continually, walking everywhere, and satisfying their appetites with whatever they desired, laughing and mocking at every mournful accident, and so they vowed to spend day and night for now they would go to one taverne, then to another, living without any rule or measure . . .” (quoted in Campbell, 1931, p. 137).

The bubonic plague produced results that sociologists look for in many other cases of mass hysteria: generalized fear and mistrust, the scapegoating of minorities and of those who are supposed to relieve the situation, and piety by some and debauchery by others.

The modern parallel: War and mass hysteria Today, wars have become our version of the Black Death. During wars, when survival becomes uncertain, church attendance increases. At the same time, particularly

among soldiers who face death, there is a greater desire to experience the pleasures that remain—“wine, women, and song” or drugs. Looting and raping may occur as all normal social restraints dissolve.

The losing side in a war looks for scapegoats, including the leaders who failed them. Drabek and Quarantelli (1967), who conducted disaster research on several tragic fires, found that people would rather blame individuals than laws and procedures. During World War II, blame fell on the American admiral who could not believe that the Japanese were approaching Pearl Harbor and on British generals who could not hold back the Germans in North Africa.

Minority groups also become scapegoats during war. In World War II, Japanese-Americans were moved to “relocation camps” in the desert. Rumors circulated that they had secret signaling devices to guide Japanese aircraft to American targets. Even symbols of the enemy have suffered. During World War I, dachshunds as well as German-Americans were attacked on the streets, and several Japanese cherry trees were cut down in Washington, D.C., during World War II.

The modern witch hunt In the United States after World War II, people began to look for “subversive elements” rather than witches. Thus began a period of spy hunts, loyalty oaths, widespread feelings of fear and distrust, and the infamous “witch hunts” of Senator Joseph McCarthy. J. Edgar Hoover found America threatened by “the most evil, monstrous plot against mankind since time began.” McCarthy feared “a conspiracy so immense, an infamy so black, as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of mankind.” McCarthy called the previous Roosevelt and Truman administrations “twenty years of treason” (Belfrage, 1963, pp. 119–120; Cook, 1971). He then moved against lib-

erals, who became “commiesymp” (Communist sympathizers), and against the State Department, especially those members who correctly foresaw the triumph of Mao Tse-tung in China.

Crowd Behavior: Types and Characteristics

Sociologists use the word *crowd* to refer to a temporary, unstructured collectivity of people who are at least somewhat aware of each other and influenced by each other. Crowds form at sports events, airport baggage counters, fires, and accidents. Sociologists have defined and described several types of crowds. These types range along a continuum from those characterized by little action or interaction to the extreme of those characterized by very close interaction and violent behavior. Casual crowds interact least; active crowds interact most.

Casual • Conventional • Expressive • Orgiastic • Active
crowd crowd crowd crowd crowd

Casual crowds are those which happen to gather at one time and place and find a unifying focus of interest. People on a beach who are all watching a whale that someone has sighted are an example of a casual crowd. Members of such a crowd interact only slightly. The absorbed interest of one member guides others' interest. People will probably show their interest, and at least one crowd member may tell about having seen a much bigger whale. Soon the casual crowd disperses, having done little but watch.

Conventional crowds are audiences, whether in a lecture hall, theater, or stadium. Their behavior is usually too clearly defined by social norms to constitute a notable case of collective behavior. However, members of an audience influence each other, heightening or

lessening each other's enjoyment of the program by their applause or other response. Some crowd members give catcalls, hisses, and boos—types of behavior not clearly defined by the norms. In more extreme cases, fights or other disorders can break out among members of a conventional crowd, changing the very nature of the crowd to an active crowd, which we will describe below.

Expressive crowds are those in which expression is an end in itself—a point that distinguishes them from audiences, which can also be very expressive. In some types of religious revivals, characterized by singing, shouting, and perhaps “speaking in tongues,” the crowd's only aim is to express religious fervor. School football rallies are another example of expressive crowds.

Orgiastic crowds are a special type of disorderly crowd whose celebrating has gotten out of hand. The orgiastic crowd may form during a party in which people get drunk, brawl, throw each other and the furniture out the windows, disturb the neighbors, and are hauled in by the police. Some societies have provided special occasions for orgiastic behavior. The Roman Saturnalia, for example, was a December celebration of Saturn, characterized by general license regarding drink and sex. In some cases a conquering army turns into an orgiastic crowd, burning, looting, and raping.

Active crowds When the word *crowd* appears without a modifying adjective, it usually means an *active crowd*. Examples include panics—people running from sniper fire, tear gas, or floods—as well as social disorders like mob and riot actions. Active crowds, like orgiastic crowds, have been characterized as irrational, spontaneous, and suggestible. Sociologists have offered conflicting theories about active crowds, some of which stress their irrationality much more than others.



An orgiastic crowd is often one whose activities get out of hand, as in the case of this crowd in Afghanistan which stormed this prison to release political prisoners in protest against the presence of the Soviet military in their country. (Philippot/Sygma)

Casual crowds consist of people who happen to be at the same place, as on the beach; interaction is minimal. (Dennis Stock/Magnum)



Crowd Action: Conflicting Theories

In Herbert Blumer's view of crowds (1955), the emphasis is on what the people in the crowd are thinking. Others consider it more important to ask who becomes involved in crowds in the first place. Still others concentrate on the norms that emerge once a crowd collects. Let us turn first to Blumer's ideas.

Contagion in crowd interaction Observers of an angry mob may think they see evidence




An expressive crowd is concerned primarily with expressing emotions. (© Jim Amos 1972/Photo Researchers, Inc.)

A conventional crowd follows well-established norms, as in this audience at a concert. (Katrina Thomas/Photo Researchers, Inc.)

of a *group mind*, people entirely of one thought. How else do we explain the unison of a violent crowd? More accurate terms for *group mind* include *circular reaction*, *social contagion*, and *heightened suggestibility*. Let us take these terms one by one.

Circular reaction is the process by which crowd members tend to intensify each other's fear, anxiety, or hatred. Active crowd members mill around, look at each other, and interpret each other's emotions. The cries of a warrior band, the chanting of political demonstrators, or the furious grimaces of onlookers at a brutal arrest all tend to reinforce the emotional level of the crowd. This circular reaction produces *social contagion*—the rapid



spread of an action through a crowd. One onlooker picks up a brick and others follow; one demonstrator rushes a police officer and others join in; one waiting airline passenger moves to the terminal exit and the entire crowd in the waiting room pushes forward. Actions like yelling and shaking fists, throwing rocks, breaking windows, or running travel rapidly through a crowd. People catch others' excitement because of *heightened suggestibility*. This occurs when emotionally aroused people in an ill-defined situation tend to follow others' suggestions without reflection. *Crowd contagion* describes imitation; *heightened suggestibility* describes the following of suggestions of self-appointed leaders. For example, some mobs have stood by and jeered but not attacked (the jeering illustrates social contagion). But when someone has said in a commanding voice, "Let's lynch the son of a bitch," heightened suggestibility has made the mob attack.

Convergence theory The social-contagion explanation of crowd behavior describes spontaneous crowds very well. But it may ignore the dynamics involved when people know ahead of time what they want to do in a crowd (Turner and Killian, 1972, pp. 18–25). How do we explain the behavior of a person who willfully enters a crowd of looters to pick up a new television? How is that behavior different from the looter who is moved to violate personal values because hundreds of others are stealing? Do crowd members act as they do because they stimulate each other, or did they arrive at the scene because of the kind of people they are? *Convergence theory* maintains that people take part in crowd behavior mainly as a result of personal attitudes and predispositions. In its extreme form, convergence theory would claim that people use crowd behavior to excuse what they fear to do alone. According to this theory, participants

in mobs or riots could be viewed as angry, frustrated individuals. From this perspective, participants at emotional religious gatherings would be seen as people troubled by feelings of guilt, inadequacy, or other tensions which can be relieved by singing, praying, "testifying," and similar expressions of intense emotion.

Although convergence theory seems to apply to many types of rioters and demonstrators, it probably exaggerates the influence of individual predispositions. Convergence theory ignores the fact that different types of people are involved: would-be participants, curiosity seekers, others who try to stop the riot, and still others who may try to exploit the situation by looting. McPhail and Miller (1973) find that word-of-mouth communication and rumor are most likely to reach the willing participants. However, others may learn of the action, depending on how close to it they are and on whether it is a sudden event or has been planned. They do not all converge for the same reason. The applicability of convergence theory depends largely on the type crowd. Lynch mobs, for example, consist of people who share a single motive and a single goal. In urban riots, probably many onlookers are drawn in who had not intended to take part. Thus, convergence theory would account for lynch mobs better than urban riots.

Emergent norms The concept of *emergent norms* is another way of explaining active crowd behavior. This theory holds that crowds develop their own norms as they form. The theory assumes that the crowd is made up of people with different opinions and motives who are drawn together by the excitement of the event. When the event is a simple matter, such as a concert, a behavioral norm quickly develops. Generations of fans have screamed and cheered over such per-

formers as the Beatles and the Rolling Stones.

In the case of riots, norms change as circumstances change. The incident which provokes a riot might involve an arresting police officer, who would seem to be a logical focus of attack. But if the police officer has left by the time the crowd forms, how can the crowd show its hostility? In this case, we can imagine a norm emerging. Any property or symbol belonging to the opposition may become a target. Someone may divert attention to a merchant who is said to be a swindler; then a quick consensus forms and the crowd attacks the merchant's store. A new, or *emergent*, norm has developed. Any enemy in the area is to be attacked. The usual norms no longer work except as they limit violent actions or are used to justify them.

The emergent norm can also act to suppress riots. After the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a riot was anticipated in Cleveland. Members of the black community, partly in support of Carl Stokes, the black mayor they had helped elect, took to the streets. They talked to excited groups, urging them to keep calm, reminding them that Dr. King would have wanted it that way. The efforts of these counterrioters changed what could have been an emergent norm of violence to one of peace (Anderson, Dynes, and Quarantelli, 1974).

Each of the three theories of crowd behavior—contagion, convergence, and the emergent norm—is useful in explaining the actions of crowds in different situations.

Are crowds irrational? An early theorist about crowds, Gustav LeBon, liked to say that crowds are ruled by emotion rather than reason. At first glance, this seems true. Yet both the American Revolution and the French Revolution, which we celebrate today as triumphs for democracy, started with

crowd actions. In Paris, there was the storming of the Bastille; in Boston, the harassment of British troops and the dumping of a famous cargo of tea. As these examples show, determining whether a crowd is rational becomes a problem. An investigator must ask: "Rational in terms of whose interests?" Those who were loyal to the British and French kings saw their own actions as rational and those of the crowds as irrational. The other problem about rationality has to do with ends and means. Our opinion is so strongly influenced by our norms and values that any answer becomes a value judgment. Was the American Revolution rational? Of course. The French Revolution? Yes. The Russian Revolution? Absolutely not—it created a communist threat to our way of life. Obviously, all these statements reflect the norms of our culture.

A look at the urban riots of the 1960s makes them seem irrational. Black people burned their own areas, making their housing and shopping problems worse. There is another side. Many black leaders saw the riots as a rational way to publicize black rage. Others tried to stop the riots. As the insert "Conflicting Reactions in Riot Areas" shows, there was no consensus in the ghettos. Looking back, although a lot of damage was done, solid gains were made. Blacks gained integrated police forces, more black mayors, and better enforcement of civil rights acts. But the poor ghettos remain.

People who condemn violence sometimes say that a person who takes part in a riot is less intelligent than one who doesn't.

A study of rioters in Newark, New Jersey by Jeffery Paige contradicts this conclusion (1971). He found that the people who had little political information were not likely to riot. The people most likely to riot were those who were best informed about political events but did not trust the system. What seems to

Conflicting reactions in riot areas

A Detroit survey revealed that approximately 11 percent of the total residents of two riot areas admitted participating in the rioting, 20 to 25 percent identified themselves as "bystanders," over 16 percent identified themselves as "counterrioters," who urged rioters to "cool it," and the remaining 48 to 53 percent said they were at home or elsewhere and did not participate. . . .

[On one riot occasion in Detroit] a spirit of carefree nihilism was taking hold. To riot and destroy appeared more and more to become ends in themselves. Late Sunday afternoon it appeared to one observer that young people were "dancing amid the flames."

. . . A man threw a Molotov cocktail into a business establishment at the corner. [Fanned by winds,] the fire reached the home next door within minutes. As residents uselessly sprayed the flames with garden hoses, the fire jumped from roof to roof of adjacent two- and three-story buildings. Within the hour, the entire block was in flames. The ninth house in the burning row belonged to the arsonist who had thrown the Molotov cocktail. . . .

As the riot alternately waxed and waned, one area of the ghetto remained insulated. On the northeast side the residents of some 150 blocks inhabited by 21,000 persons had, in 1966, banded together in the Protective Neighborhood Action Committee (PNAC). With professional help from the Institute of Urban Dynamics, they had organized block clubs and made plans for the improvement of the neighborhood.

When the riot broke out, the residents, through the block clubs, were able to organize quickly. Youngsters, agreeing to stay in the neighborhood, participated in directing traffic. While many persons reportedly sympathized with the idea of a rebellion against the "system," only two small fires were set—one in an empty building.

From Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, pp. 4, 5, 7.

set off rioters from nonrioters is the degree of commitment to a cause. Studies of rioters in Paris and London during the eighteenth century, including those who stormed the Bastille, show the same combination: a fairly high degree of political information and very little trust in the system (Rudé, 1971).

Rumors and Collective Behavior

"The police are going to fire tear gas any minute." "A bunch of black teenagers just raped a white girl." "All Jews are being deported to concentration camps." Some rumors are sim-

ply gossip. Others are far more serious. Riots and lynchings sometimes stem from unfirmed rumors or exaggerated and twisted versions of actual events. *Rumor* is a form of communication that arises whenever people want to know what is happening but can get little dependable information. Most rumors spread by word of mouth. Sometimes contradictory rumors are spread. In these cases, rumors that seem easiest to believe last longest. The insert, "Where Rumor Raged," from a study of Detroit, shows that fear stimulates rumor. In this case, white people were afraid for their children and black people

feared that they might be put in concentration camps or become victims of mass murder.

In the summer of 1967, Detroit had been hit by race riots, and the city was haunted by fear. As the summer ended, rioting was brought under control, but all through the winter of 1967–1968 more riots were anticipated. Rumors spread in all major cities, but in Detroit the situation became worse because of a newspaper strike that made it hard to get accurate news. As usual in a conflict situation, extremists on both sides spread rumors that helped to keep the city on edge. Two small right-wing newspapers spread the message that the black riots were part of a communist conspiracy. On the other side, an extremist black newspaper fed the rumor that plans were being made to set up concentration camps for black leaders and that whites were planning to wipe out the black race.

To stop the rumors, the city of Detroit set up a rumor control center. People could phone in to ask about the accuracy of stories they had heard. The most common rumors were tabulated and analyzed.

Rumors not only reinforce the fearful images conflicting groups build up about each other but also express fear for those things people value most highly—their homes, children, and sexuality.

Fashions and Fads: Commercialism or Collective Behavior?

Fashions are widely accepted customs in dress, speech, music, art, and other areas. In the West, fashion often seems so manipulated by business that it does not appear to be part of collective behavior. Hemlines go up or down, while hula hoops, surfboards, and skateboards come and go. However, the public has something of a veto. Men can rebel against tight-fitting jackets. Women can fight the

“new look” for the season. In exercising this veto, consumers add an element of collective behavior to fashion. It is also true that some groups take up the extremes of style, making them more successful than even the designers had expected. These extremes of style, usually called *fads*, are quickly adopted and just as quickly dropped. *Fad* is a somewhat belittling word; we think that young or immat-

Hair styles, like music styles, may or may not express social attitudes. The style pictured here, starting among black people, originally expressed a type of subcultural loyalty. Like many subcultural styles, it eventually became a fad among members of the majority group of white Americans as well. (David S. Stricker/Monkmeyer)



Where rumor raged MARILYN ROSENTHAL

The first rumor received by the center went like this: "Mrs. H. heard from her neighbor who heard from her aunt, who heard from a lady in Birmingham (Michigan), who heard from her neighbor who heard from her cleaning lady that the riot was to start July 1st. The lady in Birmingham had asked her cleaning lady to work on July 1st, and the cleaning woman had responded by saying she could not work on July 1st as this was the day the riot was to start."

That first day the center received 96 calls; there was to be a day when it would receive 1600.

By the time the rumors faded away, more than 10,000 calls were recorded, and the great majority of rumor callers were thought to be white. The center developed an elaborate classification system, but one especially frightening rumor defied the usual classifications.

The Castration Rumor

The castration rumor seems to erupt at many times of crisis in history, and it has cross-cultural variants, appearing in Egyptian mythology and elsewhere. While castration rumors were much more frequently heard in whispered private conversation, they did make their way to the center. Although they appear to have had no basis in either fact, incident, or statement, they are of such a special, highly charged nature that they must be examined separately.

The essence of the rumor was this: A mother and her young son are shopping at a large department store. At one point the boy goes to the lavatory. He is gone a long time, and the mother asks a floor supervisor to get him. The man discovers the boy lying unconscious on the floor. He has been castrated. Nearby salesclerks recall that several teenage boys were seen entering the lavatory just before the young boy and leaving shortly before he was discovered. If the story is told in the white community, the boy is white and the teen-agers are Negro. If it is told by Negroes, then the mother and the boy are black and the teen-agers white. . . .

[The same type of rumor appeared in other cities and has accompanied wars.]

The anxiety triggered deep emotional response. Every person is to some extent responsive to castration anxiety, as a current problem or as a vestigial remnant of childhood development. Some in the community experienced this current stress as a spontaneous eruption of castration anxiety manifesting itself in the castration rumor. This was the only explanation of the castration rumor that anyone had to offer.

Barring proof of a specific incident, this explanation would appear convincing. However, one other element can't be neglected: the reality of historical memory. While there may have been no racial incidents of castration in Detroit, old stories of white castration of blacks in the South are not unknown, nor untrue. Individuals may not recall specific cases, but vague memories and hazy recollections of hearing or reading of them linger in the black community's historical memory. So the psychological dynamics suggested by psychiatrists are given added probability as they operate within a context of a plausible historic event.

From Marilyn Rosenthal, "Where Rumor Raged." Published by permission of Transaction, Inc., from TRANSACTION, vol. 8, no. 4, Copyright © 1971 by Transaction, Inc.

ture people follow fads, while more responsible adults follow fashion. Actually, in many cases young people wear comfortable clothes, while middle-class businesspeople never remove their heavy jackets. Fashion is respectable and approved by tradition; fads are not.

Fads also include new ways of having fun: packing phone booths or Volkswagens, the "streaking" of the early 1970s, Frisbees, disco dancing, hang gliding, use of marijuana or "coke," renewed interest in roller-skating, C.B. radios, and idolizing of popular singers and musicians. In all these cases, the groups which adopt the fads are showing varying degrees of spontaneous action, only partly directed by the cultural tradition. The drastic changes in music and hairstyles that occurred in the 1960s provide good examples of major cultural fads that can be viewed in conflict perspective. They expressed conflict with what was called "the establishment" that supported a war in Vietnam and a society characterized by racial inequality.

Music Singers and popular songs come and go, but for many years most popular musical lyrics dealt with love themes—or blues themes when love went wrong. In the 1960s music changed: Lyrics protested social and political wrongs, folk songs became more popular, new tempos were used, electronics was added to instruments, and the music itself became more inventive. The Beatles, the Rolling Stones, Bob Dylan, and Joan Baez created music very different from earlier jazz or other types of popular music. Several writers have viewed this music not merely as a new style or fad but as a social phenomenon symbolic of a protesting generation (Gleason, 1967; Rosenstone, 1969, pp. 132–144). Robert Rosenstone sums up briefly what the new music was saying:

This, then, is the portrait of America that emerges in the popular songs of the 1960s which

can be labeled as "protest." It is, in the eyes of the song writers, a society which makes war on peoples abroad and acts repressively toward helpless minorities like Negroes, youth, and hippies at home. It is a land of people whose lives are devoid of feeling, love, and sexual pleasure. It is a country whose institutions are crumbling away, one which can presumably only be saved by a sort of cultural and spiritual revolution which the young themselves will lead.

Whether one agrees wholly, partly, or not at all with such a picture of the United States, the major elements of such a critical portrait are familiar enough. . . . (p. 141)

Since 1969 when Rosenstone wrote this essay, music has changed, and the protest theme has died down with the end of the Vietnamese War. In the mid-1970s, however, some of the same protest songs became an issue in other countries.

American music of the 1970s had no unifying political protest theme but spoke to a pleasure-seeking "me generation." Disco involved less protest and more dancing beat. Punk rock, with its emphasis on alienation, violence, shock value, and the profanation of all that is sacred, may be a type of protest, but not of a definable political type.

A CULTURAL-ORIGINS THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

What cultural traits produce actions like the American race riots of the 1960s, the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, or the Red Guard terrorism of Mao's China? Neil J. Smelser has tried to analyze all types of collective behavior in terms of the cultural traits associated with them. To Smelser, the root causes of collective behavior lie in conflict between particular groups and society or in conflict between old norms and emergent new ones. Although applicable to other forms of

collective behavior, his analysis is particularly helpful in the study of such conflict situations as riots, terrorizations, mob actions, and other forms of hostile outbursts. He uses the concepts of *structural conduciveness*, *structural strain*, *generalized beliefs*, *precipitating incidents*, *mobilization*, and *social control*. Smelser believes that these six factors must all be at work before hostile outbursts (mobs or riots) occur. If these factors are all at work, such outbursts are sure to come. Each of these concepts is described below and is applied to Smelser's analysis of racial riots.

Variables Producing Hostile Outbursts

The term *structural conduciveness* describes a society structured so that it has many conflicting interest groups that make themselves heard, communicate freely with each other, and may clash. This kind of society is open to collective behavior of all types, including riots, demonstrations, social movements, fads, and crazes. The fact that ours is a multiracial society means that we are structured in a way conducive to conflicts and riots. Structural conduciveness is only one factor that makes collective behavior possible; it does not make such behavior inevitable.

Structure refers to the relationship of each part of society to another. Such parts may include a system of popular elections, free enterprise economics, monogamous marriage, and universal education. *Strain* occurs when parts of the system do not—or do not seem to—work properly or mesh with other parts. If, despite the election process, the government becomes remote from the people, structural strain arises. Black people have long felt that government processes are insensitive to their needs. This feeling has been especially strong among black militant leaders. If cultural norms and educational systems call for equal opportunities but minority groups,

poor people, and women feel excluded, then another source of strain develops.

Generalized beliefs—beliefs widely held in the society—have already been mentioned in reference to hysteria. The generalized belief at the time of the urban riots was a bitter one: belief in the exploitation of blacks by white society, specifically by landlords, ghetto store owners, and prejudiced city councils and police. In a sense, this generalized belief also contained a millennial element—the feeling that the day of black equality was at hand.

Precipitating incidents are events that touch off collective behavior. These are not the same as *causes*. The urban riots of the 1960s had many causes; but sometimes, as in the Watts area of Los Angeles, the incident that touched off the explosion—the precipitating incident—was minor. In Watts, it was the arrest of a black man on a drunk driving charge. If tensions are high enough, only one incident is needed to set off an explosion.

The term *mobilization* as used by Smelser refers to alerting people to the situation after the precipitating incidents have occurred. It includes spreading propaganda, notifying political activists, and trying to get community support. Many people, including then director of the F.B.I., J. Edgar Hoover, thought a national organization was mobilizing people for the urban riots of the 1960s. After investigating the riots, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders concluded that there was no such national organization. It did, however, find organizations issuing leaflets and spreading information to mobilize people on a local scale.

Even during the ghetto riots of the 1960s, there was a degree of *social control*. Many people in the ghetto had internalized the norm of nonviolence and acted as counter-rioters. Even in tense situations, some people feel they have an interest in keeping the peace. When nonviolence norms fail, however, social control depends on force; but

even police power could not stop the riots of the 1960s. In general, even if police power is increased, a society cannot continue to rely on force alone. Unless most of its members favor social control, society is in a weak position whenever structural strain and antagonistic generalized beliefs are at work.

Inevitability of Riots?

Smelser's theory seems to imply that if the six factors described above are at work, collective behavior must occur. Actually, most of the factors at work in the 1960s are probably with us now. Why, then, have there been no riots in recent years? Seymour Spilerman (1971) questions whether riots will occur if there are problems in only one small area or city. During the 1960s, riots in one city seemed to trigger riots in others. This was not just imitation. Tensions in the society as a whole had reached the explosion point. Therefore Spilerman concludes that riots depend on events and communications running through the whole society. Those favoring Smelser could argue that generalized beliefs have changed since the 1960s, when black Americans were far more optimistic than they are now about gaining economic equality. It is true that in recent years far more black people have moved up in politics, entertainment, and the business and professional worlds. But most ghetto residents are not much better off. At the same time, however, civil rights legislation, an increase in the number of black mayors, and better integration of police forces have probably all worked to reduce tension in black communities (Spilerman).

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

American society has seen movements to abolish slavery, enfranchise women, outlaw liquor, ban nuclear weapons, stop wars, and

to achieve other aims. Social movements are the longest-lasting forms of collective behavior. Like many other forms of collective behavior, they grow from discontent with existing social conditions. If they succeed completely, their programs become part of the institutional structure of society.

Patterns in Social Movements

A *social movement* is a collective effort to change society; in some cases, it is an effort to resist forms of social change. We will talk about resistance movements separately. For now, we will use the women's movement and the civil rights movement to illustrate the way social movements work for social change in the form of equality. Both resistance and pro-change movements generally share certain developmental patterns. Armand Mauss (1975, pp. 62–66) outlines a natural history of social movements in five stages: incipency, coalescence, institutionalization, fragmentation, and demise.

Incipency The *incipency* stage of a social movement develops when a few leaders who attract loyal followers—Martin Luther King or Betty Friedan—first define an existing social problem that is contrary to social norms. Although inequality had always existed, the incipency stage of the civil rights and women's movements required mobilizing public attention on the perceived problem and outlining a program of change. During the incipency stage, the few leaders vocalize the feelings of the public who are also concerned with the problem. Also at this stage, the rest of society usually shows a certain hostility to the movement. Leaders must navigate between being perceived as extremist fanatics or ineffectual compromisers. A successful inner ring of leaders will attract an outer ring of willing workers for the cause.

Coalescence During this stage, organiza-

tions form, programs of action are agreed upon, and alliances are forged with existing organizations—perhaps the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People or the American Association of University Women. A few political leaders now will side with the cause, and society at large will stop considering the leaders of the movement as mere cranks or fanatics. Although hostility may endure, people begin to take the social movement seriously.

Institutionalization A social movement is institutionalized when it turns into a large, nationwide organization, complete with many members, full-time staff, and considerable financial resources. During this stage, the movement grows increasingly respectable. Politicians treat it cautiously and avoid open opposition or disparagement. Many see possible political advantages in supporting or making compromises with the movement.

Institutionalization may take place in another sense: society's adoption of much of the movement's program. In both the civil rights and women's movements, legislation, court decisions, and hiring practices in government and some businesses have promoted greater equality.

Fragmentation When a movement gains many but not all of its demands, it faces the danger of fragmentation. Peripheral members may say, "But things are so much better now, let's relax." Purists within the movement will try to eradicate all causes of dissatisfaction. At the sign of early hiring gains, for instance, many nonmilitant women and blacks stopped actively supporting these social movements. As we saw in Chapters 7 and 8, despite improvement, institutional racism and sexism remain firmly entrenched in the habits, customs, and establishments of society. The fragmentation of social movements may have contributed to this "defeat."

A strong women's movement actually did exist at the beginning of this century. But it fragmented after the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, which gave women the right to vote. Enough gains had been made so that movement leaders could not for years rouse a following to pursue further the issue of equal rights. Similarly, many people without clear social perceptions assumed that American blacks had won equality when the North won the Civil War.

Demise Members often fail to recognize that their social movement has reached a state of *demise*, or decline. Others look on these stalwarts as odd, wondering, "What are they griping about?" To date, neither the women's movement nor the civil rights movement is in demise, although fragmentation seems to exist in the latter. Demise did occur with the prohibition movement, however, which was led by the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). Despite the prevalence of alcoholism in America, the WCTU has lost its political clout and is generally considered marginal.

Types of Movements

We have been discussing *egalitarian movements*, those designed to gain equal rights for the groups they represent. Chicanos, American Indians, gays, and the handicapped have recently formed egalitarian movements. In the past, labor movements arose to more nearly equalize workers and management. Even the public education movement of the 1800s was considered an egalitarian movement (to give all children an equal chance in life). American society has produced many egalitarian movements out of the strain between our proclaimed social norm of equal rights for all and our failure to realize that goal.

Resistance movements are social movements to resist change. An antipornography move-

ment is designed to stop the trend toward more sex in books, movies, and magazines. An antiabortion movement has mobilized to resist public acceptance of abortion. The John Birch Society, prominent in the 1950s, aimed to stop what its members considered a drift toward communism.

Revolutionary Movements

Revolutionary movements are those that try to overthrow existing political and economic systems and power structures. Using the Puritan Revolution of England, the American Revolution, and the Russian Revolution as models, Crane Brinton has looked for certain similarities in the successful revolutionary movement (1952). He found that all require many people distributed throughout the social structure who are discontented with the old regime. They also require leaders who formulate a new ideology and promise the beginning of a new age for humanity. (An *ideology* is a system of ideas that gives a reason for a particular way of life or social system, such as democracy or dictatorship.) Brinton found that the leaders of revolutionary movements do not come from the most alienated and dispossessed segments of the population. Leaders arise as a new class of people comes to power. In the countries he studied, Brinton identified that new class as the middle class, not the proletariat as Marx theorized.


Brinton found that despite setbacks from time to time, there was a long period of rising prosperity before these successful revolutions took place. Especially for the middle classes, this prosperity created frustration; people felt that much more could easily be accomplished. Therefore the middle class pressed their ineffective governments for change. In each case, the ruling monarchy, deeply in debt, tried to levy higher taxes and succeeded in alienating the people. Dissension grew within the ruling class and the armed forces.

The final collapse came with the failure of the armed forces to defend the old regime, either through inability or because they had swung to the insurgents.

The revolution in Iran that deposed the Shah in 1979 fits the pattern described by Brinton quite well. Despite widespread poverty in the country, Iran had developed a prosperous middle class. However, the middle class saw a better chance of prospering

Revolutionary movements can be successful when there is discontent throughout the social structure, ideological leaders emerge as a new class comes to power, there is rising prosperity for the new class, and dissension develops between the rulers and the armed forces.

(Giannini/Sygma)



without the Shah and his family who had appropriated vast wealth for themselves and the military. Consistent with Brinton's analysis, the Shah was deserted by other Iranian leaders and by most of the military service. At first glance, the aims of the Iranian revolution seem to differ from the aims of other revolutions. Although it called for liberation from the ruling dynasty (a characteristically modern change), it also called for a return to the Holy Koran (written in the seventh century) as the guiding principle of its government. But revolutions nearly always claim legitimacy in terms of the historically sacred values of a people. In this respect, the Iranian revolution resembles other kinds of social movements.

DISASTERS AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Like revolutions, natural or humanly made disasters may disrupt social organization and create forms of collective behavior. In a minority of cases, disasters result from social conflicts and riots, revolutions, and wars. More commonly, disastrous floods, famines, fire, and disease result from acts of nature or human negligence. In all cases of disaster, however, a certain amount of spontaneous collective behavior arises, especially if the disaster is sudden and unexpected. When there is forewarning of disaster, the police, local and state governments, the Red Cross, and other relief agencies are prepared to give aid. Then public reaction is less spontaneous and more socially controlled than after sudden, unexpected disasters. In areas of frequent tornadoes or earthquakes or floods, for instance, many people are psychologically prepared for them, and public agencies are also likely to be prepared. These disasters need not lead to panic. In contrast, when the nu-

clear accident at Three Mile Island caught the public, the government, and social agencies unaware, the situation for a time approached panic.

Prevalence of Disasters

Stephen Green, writing about international disaster relief, hypothesizes that disasters may grow more frequent in the future despite modern technology, rapid communication, and control of epidemics (1977). He predicts this development because modern populations are much larger and more geographically concentrated in cities than previously. We face more self-made disasters because of possible nuclear accidents or terrorist bombs and because urban populations are so dependent on vital support systems for transportation, food, power, and other necessities. Civil disturbances, accidents, or such natural disasters as floods and earthquakes can sever such supply lines.

Less developed countries, which are also undergoing rapid urbanization and population increase, are not always organized well for coping with disaster and are, therefore, particularly vulnerable. Of the sixty-six major disasters listed by Green for the years 1972 to 1976, twenty-four occurred in Africa (mainly famines and civil disorders), fifteen in southern and eastern Asia, and twelve in Latin America. The types of disasters were, in descending order of frequency, floods, hurricanes, epidemics, droughts, earthquakes, hostilities and civil disturbances, fires, volcanic eruptions, and landslides. In the decade 1965 to 1975, 439 million people were affected by disasters; 3,633,000 were killed. Death rates were highest in underdeveloped nations, but the nature of the disasters, especially floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, makes it clear that the United States and other industrialized nations are not immune.

Disaster and Panic

As we have said, disaster does not necessarily lead to panic. Panics occur most frequently when people are trapped, as when fire occurs in a crowded theater, or when a revolutionary crowd finds itself completely surrounded by the police. When openings for escape are severely limited, people fight for those openings. An illustrative if rather unusual case of how people can be trapped and, therefore, panic occurred at a rock concert in Cincinnati in December 1979. A huge crowd had gathered early and was waiting outside the doors to get in. No one would open the doors, frantic pushing started, and twelve people died. The first reports said people had been killed by being trampled, but the actual cause of death was suffocation. (See the insert "Disaster at a Rock Concert.")

Competition and Cooperation in Disasters

Richard Berk (1974) contrasts two types of reactions to frightening situations, the crowd that competes and the crowd that cooperates. A *competing crowd* contains people who struggle with each other to escape danger. School fire drills aim to prevent such competition in case of danger by providing leaders and uniform, rational escape plans for all. During the 1940s, a competing crowd tore for the exits of the Cocoanut Grove, a Boston nightclub, and many people died in a pile of bodies just inches from safety. In *cooperating crowds*, people work together, perhaps by operating the lifeboats to save passengers from a sinking ship or by gathering to catch people jumping from burning buildings. Both types of crowds are the kinds of polar opposites that sociologists call *ideal types*, and most crowds actually fall somewhere between the extremes. At the Cincinnati rock concert, only limited cooperation, such as helping

fallen people back onto their feet, was possible.

When disasters recur, people become psychologically prepared. A study of the bombing of London in World War II illustrates this point. At the first bombings, many people, especially those with children, rushed from the city. Despite continued bombings, most of them soon returned. Some slept in the subways, but eventually most remained calmly at home, happier to face the enemy than the inconvenience of moving out (Titmuss, 1962).

Disaster does not usually bring mindless panic. More typical are rescue attempts, as in this flood scene, and searches for relatives and friends. (Chip Hires/Gamma-Liaison)



Disaster at a rock concert

He had gotten to the plaza at 2:40 the afternoon of December 3rd because he wanted to be sure they got good seats; he had brought a book with him to read. That book, *Structuralist Poetics* by Jonathan Culler, was still in his right hand as he lay on the concrete. Someone, miraculously, helped him to his feet and he was back in the crush, his arms pinned to his sides. At one point he was within five feet of a closed door, but he had no control over his movement. At times his feet were off the ground. Despite the cold, he was drenched with sweat. He couldn't breathe. He and everyone around him had their heads tilted straight back, their noses up to try to get some air. He noticed that an actual steam, a vapor, was rising off the crowd in the moonlight. He would later be angered to read it was a "stampede," because to him it was a concentration of too many people in too small a space with nowhere to go but forward—people in the back yelling, "One, two, three, push!" but they didn't know people in front were falling. There was little noise. Some people tried to calm those who were panicking. Some shouted, "Stay up! Stay up or you're gone!" Some chanted, "Open the fucking doors!"

By Chet Flippo from *Rolling Stone Magazine*. By Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., © 1979. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.

After the London experience psychiatrists found to their amazement a population psychologically healthier than before the war. One explanation lies in Durkheim's analysis of suicide: the rate drops during wars if people feel a sense of unity and purpose. Also, people tend to develop a kind of magical belief best stated as, "Don't worry. Either the bomb's got your name on it, or it hasn't." Furthermore, many working-class English had been impoverished and humiliated by unemployment during the Depression before the war. When the war came, they could again be proud of contributing to a cause. The same phenomenon of psychological buoyancy often occurs when people find they can be helpful during a disaster.

Social Processes in Disaster

A study of a flood in Denver in 1965 points out some of the problems communities face in trying to mitigate disaster effects (Drabek,

1969). On the afternoon of June 16, the county sheriff's office learned that a thirty-foot wall of water was rapidly approaching Denver and would devastate the suburb of Littleton. The flood was so totally unexpected that city officials had to convince people to vacate immediately. Instead of panicking, many residents were overly calm and would not believe that anything was amiss. The police and fire departments succeeded in evacuating people; no lives were lost, but damage totaled \$350 million.

In his study of the Denver case, Drabek found a complex pattern to public acceptance of evacuation. Residents heard warnings from authorities (mainly police), friends and neighbors, and television. When they heard the warning from television or friends and neighbors, more than half the people refused to believe it. However, 75 percent of the women and nearly 60 percent of the men believed a warning from the police or fire department. Clearly, the public wanted official

word from those in a position to know—an important point about disasters.

Regardless of the source of the warning, however, many people remained at home until they received confirmation from other sources. Person-to-person interaction became very important. Some people believed warnings only after they saw neighbors packing up and leaving or when they saw police warning other families on their street. Others left only when distant relatives phoned to ask how they were getting along in the flood. Families left together even when some members remained skeptical. Many men reported not believing the reports but leaving on their wives' insistence. Family solidarity tightened in the face of disaster. The Denver disaster program succeeded in that no one was killed. But people resented the sketchiness of the warnings—a problem noted in other disasters. People wanted to know how much time they had, what to do about possessions, how to help.

People tend to be helpful in disasters, but only if they know that their families are safe. After Drabek and his colleagues studied a tornado in Topeka, Kansas, they reported that far more disaster victims received help from relatives (41 percent) than any other source. Chicano families reported the most help from relatives. Otherwise there was little variation, and social-class differences were irrelevant. In a follow-up study three years later, Drabek found that interaction between stricken families and their relatives continued slightly higher after the disaster than before. As with the bombing of London, disaster increased solidarity (Drabek et al., 1975).

SUMMARY

The collapse of the Republic of South Vietnam is used as a drastic example of many kinds of *collective behavior*. During the collapse

of the South Vietnamese government, panics, riots, looting, and orgies of killing and rape took place. The field of collective behavior includes such events and many others of a more or less spontaneous nature that take place in society—mass hysteria, rumors, reactions to disaster, mass movements, fads, and the extremely emotional behavior at some types of political rallies, religious observances, and rock concerts.

Collective behavior is associated with societies that have rapid communication, subcultures with different ways of life, and freedom of expression and action. However, some types of collective behavior occur even in societies without mass communications. The mass hysteria that accompanied the Black Death in the fourteenth century is one example. The Salem witch hunts are another. In these cases, fear spread and innocent people were made scapegoats. In our time, scapegoating has affected black people in the South and political liberals during the McCarthy era. Minor cases of hysteria have involved supposed visitors from outer space.

There are different types of crowds: *casual*, *conventional*, *expressive*, *orgiastic*, and *active*. In the last three cases, *heightened suggestibility* and *social contagion* are found. The crowd is very responsive to the behavior of others, especially the leaders. There are many theories about active crowds engaged in riots. One such is *convergence theory*, which holds that people who are ready to riot converge at the scene. It has been pointed out, however, that many participants start out as bystanders. An alternative to the convergence theory is the *emergent-norm theory*, which holds that decisions are made as the crowd gathers and decides what to do. There are also arguments over whether crowds are irrational. What seems rational to some people or societies does not seem so to others. Not all onlookers take part in riots; some actually try to stop them.

Rumors are common to active crowds (mobs and rioters). They spread and grow as they are passed along by antagonistic people. They spread especially in frightening situations in which people fear for their own lives or for their children's.

Fashions and *fads* are also considered part of collective behavior, although fads are a much better example than fashions. Since fashions are promoted by business, they can be said to have clear-cut direction from the culture. Fads are more spontaneous. They often arise among young people or minority groups and serve the purpose of fun and variety. Fads become most important to collective behavior when they symbolize social protest, as with the hairstyles and music of the 1960s. These styles often cause a struggle between conservatives and radicals.

Social movements are also part of collective behavior. Social movements typically pass through the stages of incipience, coalescence, institutionalization, fragmentation, and demise. They include *egalitarian movements*, *resistance movements*, and *revolutionary movements*. Revolutionary movements attempt drastic

change in the social order by destruction of the present power structure. The theory of Crane Brinton is presented. Brinton says that revolutionary movements are led by classes that have made a certain amount of progress and have high expectations for the future. Although he bases his conclusions on the historic cases of the American, French, and Russian revolutions, the 1979 revolution in Iran conforms quite well to the analysis he presents.

Disaster research is important in the study of collective behavior, partly as an analytical tool for investigating social interaction in extraordinary circumstances, partly to help officials and relief agencies prepare for emergencies. On a world scale, disasters may be increasingly common. Important findings from disaster studies tell us that panic is usually absent, especially if people are psychologically prepared and if officials are prepared to give practical aid. In a sudden and unexpected disaster, people may fail to heed warnings. In most cases, family and national solidarity increases during and after disasters.

STUDY GUIDE

Chapter objectives

This chapter examines an area of social life in which behavior develops that is not clearly directed by the culture. After reading it, you should be able to:

- 1 Distinguish between culturally structured behavior and collective behavior.
- 2 Recognize some types of mass hysteria and their results, especially during crises.
- 3 Be able to assess crowd behavior as to societal cause and rationality and in terms of social contagion, convergence theory, and emergent-norm theory.
- 4 Understand reasons for and possible results of the spread of rumor and be aware of the tensions that cause rumors to grow and spread.
- 5 Distinguish between fashion and fad and see why some types of fads become socially significant.
- 6 Understand stages in development of social movements and how they may affect society.
- 7 Recognize popular misconceptions about reactions to disaster and understand the importance of further disaster research.

Glossary (Complete glossary at end of text)

- Active crowd** Participants in a mob, riot, panic, or other social disorder.
- Casual crowd** A collection of people who happen to be at a particular place at the same time.
- Circular reaction** A process in which members of an active crowd move about, look at each other, interpret the glances of others, and increase their own anger, fear, or anxiety in response to the emotions they find in other faces.
- Collective behavior** Relatively spontaneous actions of groups of people to relieve feelings of dissatisfaction and anxiety.
- Conventional crowds** An audience or group of people at an orderly meeting.
- Convergence theory** The theory that people take part in crowd behavior mainly because they come together as a result of personal attitudes and predisposition.
- Emergent-norm theory** The theory that a crowd develops its own norms as it forms.
- Expressive crowd** People who are expressing their emotions, as an end in itself, in a group setting.
- Fads** Extremes of fashion, quickly adopted and quickly dropped.
- Fashions** The customs of dress, speech, music, art, and other interests that are widely accepted by leading elements of society.
- Mass hysteria** A form of collective behavior characterized by a belief that something in the environment has the power to threaten or destroy.
- Orgiastic crowd** A crowd that has gotten completely out of hand, as occasionally occurs at parties or victory celebrations.
- Rumor** A form of communication that arises whenever people want to know what is happening but can get little dependable information.
- Social contagion** The rapid spread of an action through a crowd.
- Social movements** The longest-lasting form of collective behavior, designed to create or resist changes in attitudes, behavior, and institutions.

Names to know

Herbert Blumer	Crane Brinton
Neil J. Smelser	Thomas Drabek

Part I. Multiple Choice. Select the best of the four alternative answers.

- One characteristic of collective behavior is that the actions involved are relatively (a) well organized, (b) institutionalized, (c) spontaneous, (d) communist-inspired.
- The most basic and disorganized form of collective behavior, as analyzed by Smelser, is (a) a riot, (b) mass hysteria, (c) scapegoating, (d) a fad.
- In the Black Death of 1348, Jews were made scapegoats and so were (a) priests, (b) licentious people, (c) government officials, (d) doctors.
- Modern warfare produces certain behaviors resembling those prevalent during the Black Death, including (a) scapegoating, (b) increased piety, (c) increased debauchery, (d) all the above.

5. If types of crowds are shown along a continuum, the type at the opposite pole from the active crowd is the (a) expressive crowd, (b) casual crowd, (c) orgiastic crowd, (d) conventional crowd.
6. The Roman Saturnalia is described as a type of culturally approved (a) expressive crowd, (b) casual crowd, (c) orgiastic crowd, (d) active crowd.
7. Convergence theory of active crowds is most concerned with (a) such psychological traits as heightened suggestibility, (b) the irrationality of crowds, (b) the way norms develop within a crowd, (d) the reasons people become part of a crowd.
8. Both riots and mobs are included under the term (a) active crowd, (b) expressive crowd, (c) orgiastic crowd, (d) casual crowd.
9. Studies of urban riots of the 1960s indicate that the majority of people living near the area (a) joined the riot, (b) became counterrioters, (c) stayed home, (d) took part in looting.
10. A study of urban rioters in Newark found that those who took part were (a) nonpolitical and apathetic, (b) distrustful and nonpolitical, (c) political and distrustful, (d) political and trustful in the system.
11. In the bombing of London in World War II, (a) psychologists' studies found an improvement in the psychological health of the population, (b) the longer the bombing continued, the more people fled, (c) families with children vacated the city for the duration of the bombing, (d) unemployment became worse because of disruption of industry.
12. In her article "Where Rumor Raged," Rosenthal says that the castration rumor (a) reflects an actual case in Detroit, (b) was spread by whites but not blacks, (c) has occurred before in history, (d) was too implausible for blacks to believe.
13. In the 1965 flood in Denver, reported by Drabek, a major problem was (a) convincing the people a disaster was imminent, (b) instant panic, (c) a failure to believe police and fire department personnel, (d) that members of families did not stay together in a decision to evacuate.
14. Most social movements of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States could be characterized as (a) radical movements, (b) egalitarian movements, (c) movements of world rejection, (d) revolutionary movements.
15. Brinton would agree that revolutionary movements (a) are led by the poorest elements of society, (b) occur after long periods of hopeless poverty, (c) occur only if there appears to be hope for the future, (d) occur only if promoted by outside interests.

Part II. True-False Questions

1. Although the collapse of South Vietnam resulted from war, most of the traits of collective behavior were present in the final days.
2. Turner and Killian define *collective behavior* as "actions of groups that operate without clear-cut direction from their culture."
3. During the Black Death, all the people became much more pious and restrained than before.
4. In a modern, scientific age, there are no more hysterical cases of fear of devils, possession, and the like.
5. The "witch hunt" of Senator McCarthy's time fits the text description of mass hysteria quite well.

- 6 A classic case of mass hysteria occurred during World War II and resulted in sending Japanese-Americans to relocation centers.
- 7 Herbert Blumer has provided much better explanations than did LeBon of how crowd contagion takes place.
- 8 Convergence theory holds that all people at the scene of a riot or mob action will inevitably be drawn in.
- 9 Emergent-norm theory assumes that after a crowd gathers, decisions are made.
- 10 People who take part in riots are less intelligent than the general public.
- 11 Rumors are most likely to spread if they fit the existing ideas of the people who hear them.
- 12 A common rumor about a little boy being castrated was spread in Detroit by whites about blacks and by blacks about whites.
- 13 Disaster seldom leads to what could be called *insane panic*.
- 14 Fads and fashions become important when they seem to symbolize a major change or a threatening opinion.
- 15 Stephen Green expects fewer large-scale disasters in the future because of improved communication and transportation of supplies.

Questions for discussion

- 1 In your experience, what types of group interaction have led to the greatest social contagion?
- 2 Draw a parallel between the scapegoating of Jews and doctors during the Black Death and more recent examples of scapegoating. (Try to think of examples other than the ones given in the text, involving other minority leaders, or social movements.)
- 3 Which, in your opinion, better accounts for race riots—convergence theory or emergent-norm theory? Answer the same question with regard to student antiwar demonstrations and lynch mobs.
- 4 Taking the role of an English Tory, comment on the irrationality of the crowd at the Boston Tea Party.
- 5 From your own experience or from your reading, analyze a case of rumor, distortion of the facts, and conformity to the preconceptions of the rumor spreaders.
- 6 Why is our society more likely to have social movements than some other societies?
- 7 If the theories of Brinton and Davies are correct, what societies today would be likely to have revolutionary movements?
- 8 List as many current social movements as you can think of. What stage of development is each one in—incipiency, coalescence, institutionalization, fragmentation, or demise?
- 9 Study a disaster reported in recent newspapers or magazines. Did panic occur? Did people cooperate or behave in a “looking-out-for-number-one” manner?

Projects

- 1 Attend a college football game and analyze it in terms of structured behavior and unstructured behavior. That is, which events are called for by regulations and norms and which are not? In either case, is crowd contagion present?

- 2 Recordings have been made of the famous Orson Welles radio program "Invasion from Mars." Get a copy to play for the class and consider why it led to mass hysteria when it was presented in 1938. (This question is discussed in an article by an associate of Orson Welles, John Houseman, in *Harpers Magazine*, vol. 197, December 1948, pp. 74–82.)
- 3 If you are interested in music or literature, analyze the connection between fashion and fad in those areas. For example, look into the lives of certain innovators in those fields (Stravinsky or Schoenberg in music, Whitman in poetry, and James Joyce in prose). Why is someone considered an upstart or faddist at one time and a genius at another?
- 4 Analyze a current fad. Where did it start? What is its appeal? How does it spread? Does it symbolize new social attitudes, or is it strictly for fun?

Suggested readings (Additional readings in Instructor's Manual)

Conant, Ralph W.: "Rioting, Insurrection and Civil Disobedience," *American Scholar*, vol. 37, summer 1968, pp. 420–433. What are the preconditions of riots and what are the stages in their development? These questions are analyzed by Conant. Also, using traditional American values as his guide, Conant lists six conditions justifying nonviolent protest.

Drabek, Thomas E., William H. Key, Patricia E. Erikson, and Juanita L. Crowe: "The Impact of Disaster on Kin Relationships," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, August 1975, pp. 481–494. Mentioned in the text, this article gives encouraging evidence that relatives remain important even in a mobile, individualistic society.

_____ and Enrico L. Quarantelli: "Scapegoats, Villains, and Disasters," *Trans-Action*, vol. 4, March 1967, pp. 12–17. Why do some people make better scapegoats than others? Why do we blame people rather than inadequate laws for disasters? What happens when we blame people rather than laws and regulations? Drabek and Quarantelli examine these questions in a review of some of the greatest fire disasters in American history.

Dynes, Russell, and Enrico L. Quarantelli: "What Looting in Civil Disturbances Really Means," *Trans-Action*, vol. 5, May 1968, pp. 9–14. Why is looting rare in natural disasters but common during civil disturbances? Dynes and Quarantelli find a great difference in attitudes toward protecting private property.

Schneier, Edward V.: "White-Collar Violence and Anti-Communism," *Society*, vol. 13, March–April 1976, pp. 33–37. How did the public mood—a type of mass hysteria—make McCarthyism possible? How did HUAC (House Un-American Activities Committee) continue the work of McCarthy after his time? A story of how mass hysteria over communism led to mass fright on the part of liberals.

Key to questions. Multiple Choice: 1-c; 2-b; 3-d; 4-d; 5-b; 6-c; 7-d; 8-a; 9-c; 10-c; 11-a; 12-c; 13-a; 14-b; 15-c. True-False: 1-T; 2-T; 3-F; 4-F; 5-T; 6-T; 7-T; 8-F; 9-T; 10-F; 11-T; 12-T; 13-T; 14-T; 15-F.